Enclaves of Central Asia

Central Asia’s unique geographical position and border disputes bring researchers to complex studies of its past, present and future. Border disputes in the region consist of many components, and the one of the least described is the issue of enclaves. Enclaves appeared in Central Asia (CA) during the Soviet policy of creating national republics in 1930s and still exist today in independent CA countries. Only in the 2012-2013 three of nine enclaves faced noticeable conflict situations. These conflicts were accompanied with border closures around the enclaves and armed violence outbreaks between enclave’s population and their neighbors in surrounding country.

Pamiri faces 6

Maria Merkulova is a junior associate at Central Asia Program in Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University and intern at the Rethink Institute, Washington, DC. She worked for the independent consulting company “CEPIR” in Moscow, Russia as an analyst, focusing on Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s politics. She graduated from the Higher School of Economics National Research University, Department of Political Analysis, Moscow, Russian Federation.

Enclaves need to be studied as they are places, where problems of the countries exist in a concentrated form, making nearly every enclave a precise case-study of a state failure. Central Asian enclaves present issues such as decreasing interethnic trust, rapid population growth, weak border management, and poor governance. Conflicts around enclaves result from the state failures and provide a range of accidents based on clash of interests either between states, or between the border-line populations. Enclaves can be addressed as “weak spots” in the relationships among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, since any loud enough accident concerning enclave could create tension in their relations. Resolving the problems of enclaves, or at least making it less troubling, can help Central Asian republics to eliminate social discontent around enclaves and create less strained dialog. Currently, enclaves are poorly governed, potentially unstable regions, that are often prone to be used in political rivalry  among Central Asian states sharing Fergana Valley. Eliminating tensions around enclaves could facilitate regional cooperation, which would be of benefit for abovementioned states.

Problem overview

There are two ways to use terms “enclave” and “exclave”. In journalism the word “enclave” implies both of these meanings and define any territory separated from its mainland by the land of any other country or countries. In international law both “enclave” and “exclave” are used to elucidate which relationship we need to describe: “mainland-separated territory” or “surrounding country-separated territory”.

In this paper the term “exclave” is used regarding to the relationships between mainland and a portion of its territory completely surrounded by territory of another state or states.[1] The term “enclave” is used in reference to “outlying portion of a country, entirely or mostly surrounded by the territory of another country[2]” but the mainland is not specified. It’s also used to indicate the relationship between such a territory and a surrounding country.

There are nine “enclaves” in Fergana Valley; almost all of them are located in Kyrgyzstan. It is unclear how precise the number is, because some territories are small and their locations are not specified. The list of all Fergana enclaves mentioned in different sources  consists of: Uzbekistan’s “exclaves” – Sokh, Shakhimardan, Qalacha, Djangail, and Tayan; Tajikistan’s exclaves – Vorukh, Western Qalacha, Sarvak; Kyrgyzstan’s exclave – Barak.[3] To get a brief understanding of enclaves locations see Map 1.

map 1

Map 1 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Enclaves emerged as a result of Soviet administrative borders delimitation policy, which was taking place in 1918-1936. The delimitation process at the beginning was based on separation of nomads from settlers[4] and establishment of a specific territory for each of these lifestyles. During 1930s local Central Asian elites were constantly trying to influence administrative borders policy, but Moscow “get tired” of it and banned this question from discussion in early 1930s. Desire to seize ethnic tensions in order to create a class struggle[5] led Soviet rulers to the model of administrative division based on nationality. Information on how administrative borders were changing is widely known in the field and can be easily found, there is no need to repeat it. What we see on the map now is the same with what the Soviet Union ended up with. Nowadays borders of CA republics are based on the Soviet delimitation, albeit if creation of enclaves is Soviets work – their present condition is a result of Central Asian states national policy and border management.

When Central Asian states  abruptly gained independence, they simultaneously faced question of delimitation, demarcation and security of the borders. Border management policy in each country was a consequence of an approach to nation-building that this country has chosen: there is an important analysis of the process by George Gavrillis, a well-known scholar, specializing in Middle East and Central Asia, author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries (Cambridge University Press, 2008), where he shows how the nation-building and economic models influenced border management. According to him, Kyrgyzstan was the one who was always very active in proposing delimitation and demarcation. The idea was not to put security and customs posts until you know that this territory belongs to you and to promote transit of goods and free trade zones. Uzbekistan decided to extract resources from its closed economy, thus they closed borders and don’t let anyone or anything in or out, becoming, year by year, less integrated in regional affairs. Tajikistan had troubles with borders after the civil war (1991-1995) – as a result of huge surplus from drug-trafficking and contraband of any sort, some groups kept sections of the border undelimited to keep the flow of this contraband[6]. Gavrilis point on Tajikistan may cause a lot of questions, but the reality shows us, that Tajikistan negotiates borders only when it has been pressured by a stronger state or he has a strong interest in it. For instance, in 1999 all borders with China were discussed and demarcated. Thus Tajikistan either needs some sections to be open, or simply does not perceive the border problem as a high priority one. As for Uzbekistan, Gavrilis points out, that even before the process of delimitation and demarcation started Uzbek government initiated establishment of customs posts all around the country. This fact contributes to a strong desire of Uzbekistan to separate itself from any flow across the border. Such a desire even led to mining of the border. The reason of putting mine fields around the country was declared as a security measure valid to protect Uzbekistan from extremists flow into the country.

Nation-building policies evolved during 2000s while CA states were unproductive in terms of borders discussions, and although the approach to borders remains mostly the same – national policy changes. All three states that share Fergana Valley are conducting policy of favoring “titular ethnos” in order to create a nation, and a nation require three main things – culture, language, and territory. In order to build a perception of a territory one should have an idea of which territory is attributed to a particular society – states need to have a clear view on where their borders are, or at least where they have to be. Here they face two problems – ideal configuration of territories to which they would refer to, and the resettlement the population.

The problem of borders is important for Central Asian states, especially in Fergana Valley. Borderlines are not simply lines drawn on a map but a process, an ongoing transaction, flow of people and goods. Border management and “New silk road”-type projects (various ongoing international projects aimed at cooperation and trade in the region) can sometimes help this process and eliminate some of the border tensions – for example joining of Customs Union (Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can help them to coordinate their borders and customs regimes. The problem of enclaves, unfortunately, doesn’t look like it can be solved by such measures, because it’s not only border issues that are discussed, it’s also the enclaves’ existence which is questioned.

Exclaves of Tajikistan



map 2

Map 2 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Sarvak (Sarvan, Sarvaksoi, Sarvaki-bolo)[7] is a settlement with the only one village of Sarvak located in Uzbekistan, population is estimated from 150 people to 130 families. International news Agency Fergana conducted an expedition there in 2010 and counted 441 people in the village[8] and  the area was measured from 15 sq. km to 8.4 sq.km with 1.2 km distance to mainland Tajikistan. Tajik residents of the enclave have an opinion that there was no exclave until Uzbeks asked government in Moscow for a corridor through Tajik territory for shepherds in order for them to easily reach their grazings in 1951. Uzbekistan government’s position is that this territory was placed under management of Tajiks in 1935 for 10 years, and then prolonged in 1946, 1956, 1980 and had to end in 1990, so the territory belongs to Uzbekistan. Due to perceiving this territory as its own, Uzbek government was giving citizenship to those who live in Sarvak – as a result of this half of the population has Uzbek passports[9].

Sarvak belongs to Sogdian oblast of Tajikistan, but it seems that the latter has no actual power over Sarvak’s territory, the only entity which exercises power there is Uzbek customs.  Up until 2010 there were no Tajik radio or television, so when the children were asked: “Who is your president ?”, they answered “Islam Karimov”[10]. Border control is tense, the region has only one road leading to exclave and it was closed until 2012, so in order to reach nearest crossing point people had to take 15 km roundabout.

One of the hard parts in understanding enclaves is that sometimes a researcher can be easily deluded by drafted maps. Names of enclaves are sometimes the same as the names of the villages somewhere close to enclaves. It seems like there is an Uzbek village called Sarvak, part of which is an exclave of Tajikistan also called Sarvak. There is a report that the settlement is divided by border in two parts[11], although there is no visible border in the village. There is one school, but it has only 8-year program, which is not enough to apply to university; there is no post office or kindergarten, as there are no official representatives of Tajik authorities[12]. It looks like Tajikistan is not exercising any of its real power over this territory, though it claims it as its exclave. In 2011 during the conflict around closure of the road to Sarvak representatives from both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan claimed that they went to the region, but there was no result until 2012. Bureaucrats from Sogdian oblast administration said that they collected information and sent it “up” – to the higher level authorities in Tashkent. This can be understood as they don’t have any authority to deal with border issues. As soon as Uzbekistan has the same problems it’s no surprise that the opening of the road to enclave tool so long to achieve.[13]


map 3

Map 3 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Vorukh is relatively large Tajikistan’s exclave in Kyrgyzstan with the area of 130 sq.km and population around 30,000. Population increases 1,5-2% in a year, there are 12 mahallas (small villages). Exclave’s population has an outstanding level of regional identification, distinguishing themselves from any other state or ethnic identity. Insufficient territory and poor irrigation led to conflicts in 1982, 1988, 1989, and 2013. In addition, the only road, which connects Kyrgystan’s Leley region with other part of the country goes through Vorukh[14] which leads to different conflict situations over the use of this road and crossing customs points.

There are also multiple reports from Kyrgyzstan’s media that Tajiks from Vorukh are using the “rambling migration” – buying houses of Kyrgyzstan’s citizens who move to more developed parts of the country, so practically a part of the enclave’s population is living on the territory of Kyrgyzstan[15].

The situation in Vorukh is different from that which exists in Sarvak – the amount of Tajik people living in Vorukh make it impossible not to react on needs and problems of this exclave. Vorukh belongs to the same region of Tajikistan as Sarvak – Sogdian oblast, but it’s easy to see how different its life is. For bigger and more populated Vorukh problems with borders are being solved much faster. Vorukh has seven schools, several bank offices and young people from Vorukh often buy houses on nearby Kyrgyzstan’s land. They are clearly not so isolated, but the growth of population and cheap land in Kyrgyzstan make them move out of the enclave.

What these two enclaves have in common is the absence of local level administration.  Research of dozens of articles on the life of this territories shows that there have never been mentioned any local state institution, except custom service in Vorukh, in any of Tajikistan’s exclaves.

Western Qalacha

Western Qalacha (or Kairagach) is located in Kyrgyzstan and mapped only on the old Soviet map K-42-140. The map above shows the approximate position of the exclave. There is very little information on this territory, it is referred as a “small Tajik oasis with territory less than 1 sq.km” that was given to Tajikistan in 1930[16], and that’s all one can find on this place in Russian sources. In English – there is also only one reference[17]. Searches both in Russian and in English provide no evidence of somebody living there. One can find some information on crossing points near Kyrgyzstan’s station called Kairagach, but according to the map – the border goes through Western Qalacha, so the crossing point with this name may not relay to the enclave.

Exclaves of Uzbekistan


map 5

Map 5 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Sokh (South Sokh) is the biggest enclave in Kyrgyzstan’s part of Fergana Valley, both in terms of the size – 352 (325) sq. km, and in terms of the population – nearly 60,000 people. The population is Tajik, which raises a question: “Why this territory belongs to Uzbekistan?” There are a lot of different answers starting from “those were settled Uzbeks speaking Tajik (“Sarts”)”[18] to a popular rumor that “someone in politburo lost it in a card game”.  This enclave is located on the river Sokh, which provides possibility of irrigation and agriculture in the region. Unfortunately, as in the case of Vorukh, the only road, connecting territories of surrounding Kyrgyzstan is going through Sokh[19]. This leads to multiple conflicts, for example the one in 2013, which resulted in a situation when the road was closed for a month. Such closures directly influense people who live in the area, leaving them with only limited supply of goods and food products. In 2001 there was an attempt to negotiate a corridor, connecting Sokh with Uzbekistan, but it didn’t work out because of the land that was suggested to trade for the corridor was not seen as equivalent one by Kyrgyzstan. According to regional media[20] there was a secret agreement on giving Uzbekistan a corridor to connect Sokh with the mainland, but the governor of Batkenstaya oblast of Kyrgyzstan made this information public, because the territory called Tayan, which was exchanged by Uzbekistan to get the corridor was a ‘waste land’. Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was at that time the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, had to annul the agreement.[21] The talks about Sokh continued In May 2013 when one member of Kyrgyz parliament started a rumor that Islam Karimov told that Uzbekistan will sell Sokh to Kyrgyzstan for 1,5-2 billion dollars[22] – this led to a range of publications about Sokh in Kyrgyzstan.

Sokh is a unique case in terms of governance – it belongs to Sokhskiy raion (administrative unit of Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan) which also includes both of the North and South Sokh. This division on North Sokh and South Sokh is informal and refers to the fact that the exclave shape reminds of a hour-glass and it has two territories connected by a small neck of land (see Map 5) Sokh exclave is the biggest exclave of Uzbekistan and also a biggest enclave in Fergana Valley. It has a much better situation with education and health care services than all other enclaves in the region. Sokh also has a state-representation body – khokimyat (local authorities) located in Ravan[23], which is inside this enclave. The existence of local authorities is uncommon for the enclaves in Fergana, thus Sokh is exceptional – it’s the biggest enclave, it has the largest population, more schools and medical care, and it has a khokimyat.


map 6

Map 6 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Shakhimardan, usually referred in Russian sources as a “resort town”,  is located close to Alay mountains.  Shakhimardan is located in Ferganskiy raion of Uzbekistan and again doesn’t have any local authorities on its territory except border guards and customs offices. This enclave covers an area of 90 sq. km and the population is around 6,000[24]. Before the Soviet period Shakhimardan was a place of a pilgrimage with a large Tajik community – there is a local belief that one of the tombs of the “fourth caliph” Ali is located there. In fact, nowadays Shakhimardan is open for citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – mostly because it’s touristic potential and pilgrimage destination, though crossing the border isn’t cheap. Together with Qalacha (in Russian sources Chon-Gara), Djangail (which is possibly a part of Shakhimardan) they are sometimes called Upper (or Northern) Sokh, it seems like officially there are two Shakhimardans – south and north (which is possibly Djangail). A small village of Tayan is one more Uzbekistan’s exclave, but there is only one reference to its existence[25] and no proper map was found. Researching the map of Uzbekistan one can find a small village called Tayan located not far from the southern tip of Sokh, but there is no map showing it as an enclave. Normally we see some border at least on one map even if the exact border location is questionable, but not in a case of Tayan.

Qalacha (North Sokh, Chon-Gara, Chong-Kara)[26]

map 7

Map 7 drawn by Maria Merkulova


map 8

Map 8 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Exclave of Kyrgyzstan


map 9

Map 9 drawn by Maria Merkulova

Barak is a small Kyrgyzstan’s village located in Uzbekistan, it has nearly 600 residents and it covers an area a little bit bigger than 1 sq.km[28]. The border is not visible, even on the map. Different maps show a place under the name “Barak” near the border, but on Kyrgyzstan’s territory, it might be that borders or Barak location are incorrect. After violent outbreak in Osh a lot of Uzbeks fled to the region, as a result 250 Kyrgyz left Barak. In August of 2011 Kyrgyz government gave up 18 hectares of Kara-sui region for resettlement of young people from Barak[29]. One of the recent blocking of the enclave by Uzbeks was in January 2013 as a result of a border conflict in Sokh, which took place right before that.

Barak belongs to Kara-Sui region, Osh oblast, but as in any small enclave it doesn’t have any state representatives on its territory. The situation around Barak is rather complex – the border is unclear, and the Uzbeks migration from Osh makes the life of Kyrgyz there rather challenging. A lot of them already moved from the exclave, but Kyrgyzstan understand that if he moves all people out of there it will lose this territory to Uzbekistan. There is the same situation as in Tajikistan’s exclaves, there are no references to any regional authority in Barak, the only reference in any conflict-resolution process is that some state representatives are meeting with “residents”.

Perception of enclaves and recognition of the problem in CA countries

The problem of the enclaves is the most visible from Kyrgyzstan’s perspective, because the vast majority of the conflicts appear in enclaves located in this country. Moreover nearly all the enclaves of Fergana Valley happened to be on Kyrgyzstan’s territory. Looking on the impact of recent conflicts around Sokh, Vorukh, Kyrgyz village of Charbak, and Barak one can find two evidences that Kyrgyzstan developed a new approach to the problem of enclaves:

1. Kyrgyzstan decided to enclose Sokh with barbed wire. According to Kyrgyz media, local citizens believe this move can protect them from future aggression from the people of Uzbek village Khushiyar, who already participated in at least two big conflicts in the region in 2010 and 2013[30]. What may be puzzling is that Kyrgyzstan is using this barbed wire only on demarcated part of the border, authorities asked for an Uzbek delegation to come to the region and negotiate the rest of the borders as soon as possible. At this point Kyrgyzstan is true to the strategy of dealing only with that land, which is already discussed.

2. The conflict in Vorukh in 2013 was caused by building a road bypassing this enclave and using for this purpose some of the Tajik territories[31], recently, in addition,  Kyrgyz government assigned KGS 80,000,000 to build two roads that will go around Sokh[32]. It’s unclear, however, was the Tajik territory really violated by building the road around Vorukh – again, because there is no clear borderline.

These facts may be seen as a proof of Kyrgyz authorities’ disbelief in the possibility that thа  enclaves problem could be solved in a way it was tried to. Previous approach consisted of inefficient negotiations and attempts to use enclaves’ infrastructure for trading and delivering supplies. Securing borders and building roads around enclaves can be a good indicator of an idea that it is not efficient to use existing roads, going through the enclaves.

The possibility of conflicts and constant border crossing tentions made enclaves’ roads costly way to connect different Kyrgyz terriotories in Fergana Valley. In 2012 deputy governor of Batken province of Kyrgyzstan in an interview for Kabar agency told that Kyrgyzstan will insist on putting out of existence all the enclaves in this region[33]. Now, this point seems to be abandoned.

However, Kyrgyzstan’s desire not to touch sections of the border that are not delimited is in a mismatch with reality such as building a road on a disputed Tajik land or installing electric poles on Uzbek territory. There is a widespread idea in Kyrgyzstan’s media that some of these situations are provocations by Uzbekistan, trying to draw attention to the region and to show itself as a victim of the situation, especially when hydropower plants are being built in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. At the same time one can perceive this nonexistent-border violations as a result of Kyrgyzstan’s will to cause a situation when it’s neighboring countries don’t have any more space and time to withdraw from borders negotiations.

The discourse around enclaves in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is merely different from Kyrgyzstan’s – sometimes officials call “enclave” any small village somewhere close to the border, where other ethnic group lives. A careful researcher can notice that the main difference is in the approach per se. Uzbekistan wants to protect its border no matter who is inside it, Tajikistan likes to point out, that there are Tajiks living in disputed areas, imposing more on ethnic part of the problem, not the territorial one. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are mainly interested in keeping the enclaves accessible, which means no blockades, and Kyrgyzstan main goal is to provide safe and peaceful communication among different parts of its Batken province.

Enclaves in Fergana Valley are poorly managed by their mainlands. It’s still unclear how such big enclaves as Vorukh and Shakhimardan are governed – there should be at least some state representatives in the exclave. Statistics and media provides only a brief understanding, saying that there are customs officers, schools, medical facilities, banks, but , for example, no sign ofcourts. When media mentions militia participating in the conflict its mostly unclear whose militia is participating and where did it come from.

The same with courts – reports says, for example, that 5 cases on violence were sent to a court, but they specify neither the name nor location of this court. This is a common feature of a majority of articles on enclaves and conflicts there, so there are no reliable data and no evidence on how people organize in an absence of state. The fact that in almost any conflict around enclaves (except Sokh’s) the state is dealing with some “representatives of the enclaves residents” is supporting the idea that the mainland is  weak or reluctant in governing these territories.

It could be understood from two points: first – the mainland is afraid that having proper local governance could lead enclaves to having their own agenda and thus, their own policy; second – there is a lack of interest from the mainland in the enclave because of the absence of valuable businesses to benefit from.

Enclaves’ poor governance goes hand in hand with the lack of effective attempts to negotiate border issues and exchange projects. The only project which could be found was the attempt of Uzbekistan to get a corridor for Sokh. In the period of independent Central Asia this was the unique case when mainland shows such interest in its exclave.

The only solid explanation of this fact consists of all those characteristics that make Sokh different from other enclaves – its great size and its large population. Sokh is a place where instability is highly undesireded, a discontent in an enclave with 60,000 people inside can derange regional relations and cooperation for a time being.

Policy recommendations

The problem of enclaves has a potential to influence relationships among Central Asian states, sharing Fergana Valley, and aggravate conflicts between them.  The willingness to cooperate and carefuly negotiate issues concerning enclaves problem is essential for solving it .  Hereafter follows a list of policy recommendations and key points that should be taken into account in the process of enclaves’ problem resolution.

First and foremost, the borders around enclaves should be delimited and demarcated – it’s a prerequisite to understand which territories are discussed by parties, when we want to reach an agreement.

Second, big enclaves will remain. There is no easy way to exchange this lands and the growth of population slowly makes the problem more complex. Big enclaves need guaranteed supply of goods from the mainland and a stabilized border management, which could keep their population in a state of peace with their neighbors on the other side of the border.

Third, a question of small enclaves like Barak, Sarvak, Djangail, Qalacha and Western Qalacha is the part of the enclave problem, which can be resolved relatively easy. These enclaves can be exchanged, but understanding how hard can exchange negotiations go, the easiest way to deal with them is to give them to the surrounding country.

Life in these enclaves is more connected to the surrounding territories than to the mainland, and giving them away is not crucial to the state ideology. Naturally it’s important to give residents of these small enclaves the opportunity to choose – to stay or to move to the mainland. Due to their size small enclaves can’t be used to negotiate some additional land to the big enclaves’ territory, but they can be used as an exchange lands to get a corridor, which is possible only for Sokh.

It’s unlikely that Kyrgyzstan can give corridors to all three big enclaves, thus the Fergana part of Kyrgyzstan will become even harder manage then it is now. Uzbekistan needs the corridor to Sokh, and this corridor can be obtained by careful negotiations.

Forth, the population growth should bring new resettlement opportunities. The enclaves population is strongly bounded with the territory, but if Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will not produce the opportunity to move to the mainland, their citizens will continue to spread out the enclaves, making the ethnic problem more visible and causing more tensions.

Fifth, there is a need to establish local authorities in Vorukh and Shakhimardan. Administrative borders in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be changed in order to make these enclaves separate administrative units with their own local authorities who will contribute to enclave prosperity.

All involved states need to understand that historical situation, when ethnic division didn’t matter, is not likely to repeat. As soon as Central Asian states are moving apart from each other only the opposite trend can resolve the enclave issue. The common economic zones, open borders or establishing a different supra-national identity, accompanied with a careful and balanced management of enclaves, can bring Central Asia states to the situation when the question of the enclaves and problems it create becomes less troublesome. There is a hope, that such measures could create a better environment for discussing and solving other important issues in the region such as water management and common security in region.

[3] Enclaves of the world [Available at http://enclaves.webs.com/centralasia.htm]

[4]Sergei Abashin, “National delimitation in Fergana Valley: how it started” Islam in CIS №2 (7) 2012, 16.08.2012 [Available in russian http://www.idmedina.ru/books/islamic/?4695]

[5] Ojukeeva, T.O., XX vek: vozrojdenie natsionalnoi gosudarstvennosti v Kyrgyzstane, 1993, p.19

[6] George Gavrilis “The Dynamics of Inerstate Boundaries” [Available at http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item5562659/The%20Dynamics%20of%20Interstate%20Boundaries/?site_locale=en_US ]

[7] There are more materials under the name of Sarvak, but all of this names refer to the same place

[8] T. Rasul-zade, “Problemi anklava Sarvak ili kak vijivayt izolirovannie Tajiki v Uzbekistane” Fergana.news 07.09.2010 [Available at http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6650]

[9] Saidmurod Umurzokov, “Sarvak: kto drug a kto vrag” Maxala 02.03.2012  [Available at http://maxala.org/glavnaya/3498-sarvak-kto-drug-a-kto-vrag.html#.UYBmIyt4a2A]

[10] Alexei Volosevich, “Fergana Valley enclaves become zone of risk” Fergana.news Information agency 09.28.2005 [Available at http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=1068]

[11] Ibid.

[12] Farhodi Mehruzi, “Uzbekistan zakril put v Tajikskie anklavi” Tajmigrant.com 08.24.11 [Available at http://tajmigrant.com/Uzbekistan-zakryl-put-v-tadzhikskie-anklavy-blokada-sarvaka-kilometry-stradanij-i-boli.html]

[13] Tilav Rasul-zade, “Blokada Sarvaka: Kilometri stradani i boli” 08.11.11, Asia-Plus [Available at http://news.tj/en/node/107786]

[14] “Vorukh vishel iz blokadi” Radio Ozadi, 05.03.2013 [Available at http://rus.ozodi.org/content/tensions-in-vorukh-ended/24970574.html ]

[15] Mombekov K. “Kak Tajikistan privatizituet kirgizskie zemly” 12.14.2010 [Available at http://vorukh.ucoz.ru/news/k_mombekov_kak_tadzhikistan_privatiziruet_Kyrgyzskie_zemli/2010-12-14-350]

[17] Enclaves of the world [Available at http://enclaves.webs.com/centralasia.htm]

[18] Gubaeva, S. S. “Etnicheskii sostav naseleniya Fergany v kontce XIX-nachale XX v. : po dannym toponimii”, Tashkent : Izd-vo “FAN” Uzbekskoi SSR, 1983.

[20] “Enclaves in Central Asia’ The Golden Road to Samarquand 12.05.2005 [Available at http://amiralace.blogspot.com/2005/12/enclaves-in-central-asia_113377614557724745.html]

[21] Uzbekistan protiv ustanovlenia Kyrgyzstanom pogranichnih ograjdeniy. Gezitter.org 12.18.2012 [Available at http://www.gezitter.org/politic/16847_Uzbekistan_protiv_ustanovleniya_kyirgyizstanom_pogranichnyih_ograjdeniy_/]

[22] Aibek Shamshikeev, “U nas hvataet bogachei, kotorie mogut kupit anklav Soh za 2 milliarda dollarov, no” Gazeta “Fabula” № 9, 02/08/2013 [Avaliable at http://www.gezitter.org/politic/17878_u_nas_hvataet_bogachey_kotoryie_mogut_kupit_anklav_soh_za_2_mlrd_dollarov_no/]

[23] http://ru.ferghana.uz/soh

[24] Enclaves of the world [Available at http://enclaves.webs.com/centralasia.htm]

[25] Enclaves of the world [Available at http://enclaves.webs.com/centralasia.htm]

[28] Ivan Watson, “Central Asia ecnlaves” 06.10.2004 for NPR [Audio available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1952550]

[29] “Jitelam anklava Barak videlily 18 gektarov zemli dlya stroitelstva v Karasuiskom raione” KirTAG 08.05.2011 [Available at http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=ru/news/8937]

[30] “Kyrgyzstan otgorodit “koluchkoi” anlkav Sokh” Padio Azattik, 05.07.2013 [Available at http://rus.azattyk.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Uzbekistan_border/24840364.html]

[31] Zarema Sultanbekova “Stroitelstvo dorogi vokrug Voruha priostanovleno do razreshenia prigranichnih sporov” KLOOP, 04.12.2013 [Available at http://kloop.kg/blog/2013/04/29/stroitel-stvo-dorogi-vokrug-voruha-priostanovleno-do-razresheniya-prigranichny-h-sporov/]

[32] Shavkat Turgaev “First KGS 80,000,000 allocated to construct 2 bypass roads around Sokh enclave in Batken province” 07/02-2013 07:50, Batken – 24.kg news agency [Available at http://eng.24.kg/community/2013/02/07/25867.html]

[33] “Kirgizstan budet nastaivat na likvidatsii vsekh anklavov v Batkenskoi oblasti” Kabar, 08.17.2012 [Available at http://kabar.kg/politics/full/38862]

  • January 31, 2021