The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs

After the 1989 Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Communist Block quickly disintegrated. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought into existence15 new sovereign states; the peaceful Czechoslovak divorce of 1993 created two new countries (the Czech and Slovak republics), and the bloody disintegration of the Yugoslav federation begot statehood to its six former republics plus the former Serbian province of Kosovo in 2008. All in all, out of the eight East European countries and the USSR by the end of 1990s, 28 Post-Communist states had emerged.    

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Klara Bilgin is a visiting professor of political science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. She received her PhD in political science from the John Hopkins University in 2007. Dr. Bilgin also taught at Western Illinoins University, SUNY Geneseo, College of Notre Dame of Maryland. Dr. Bilgin currently works on revolutions and especially the aftermath of color revolutions in post-communist societies. She served as elections obvserver during the critical 2003 presidential elections in Georgia and 2004/2005 presidential elections in Ukraine and had the opportunity to observe those revolutions firsthand as they unfolded. 

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Probably one of the main obstacles, among many more, these countries had to face on their path to democratization and economic liberalization, was the simple lack of historic experience. Russia had started its experiment with Communism since its 1917 October Revolution and all of the Eastern European countries have fallen to Communism rule in the period between 1945 and 1948. This of course meant that the Russian people had to overcome 75 years (close to four generations) of history and the East Europeans transcend more than 40 years of Communist legacy. For the generation(s) born and raised in Communist post-totalitarian societies with no recollection of democratic practices, even the baby steps of democracy were difficult and uncertain.

Luckily, in the newly created international context of post-containment and post-Cold War dynamics, the United States could engage in a sustained effort to assist and support these countries in their complex processes of change. Groping along the way the Clinton administration designed a new foreign policy strategy of "engagement and enlargement" allowing for two 'revolutionary' tactics of aiding the post-communist states to emerge. First, it unleashed the power of the democracy assistance sector, led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and an array of other international and domestic institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and scores of other governmental and private agencies. Second, -it suggested a new readiness to include the Eastern European block in the previously rival 'Western' structures of global governance and defense.

The boldest move of the administration was President Clinton's decision to 'give in' to the tremendous pressure of the Polish and Czech presidents and in 1994 declare his decision to let NATO expand to the East. (Currently many Eastern Europeans remember this early U.S. vote of confidence and for that reason cherish a strong personal affinity towards President Clinton and his family.) The first East European countries to fully join the alliance in 1999 were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Today all of the former European communist states as well as the three Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are members (the Yugoslavia succession states are an exception with Croatia being the only NATO member among them). Of the 28 countries making up NATO today - 12 are former Communist rivals standing uneasily across from a former ally and currently geopolitically resurgent Russia.

For most of the eastern European countries, however, NATO membership was simply the prelude to the more desired prize of European Union membership. EU accession for these countries had both a deeply symbolic meaning, of reinstating their European identity and civilization belonging, as well as the valuable pragmatic benefits of giving them access to the common market (with its freedom of travel, work, and trade) and significant financial resources during their adjustment/accession process.

After 15 years of 'transition' - the dream of EU membership finally came true for eight former Communist states when the 'Big Bang' of the 2004 EU enlargement made the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia plus the Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus the newest members of the Union. This was the largest single enlargement of the Union in terms of people, landmass and number of countries, and it was followed by another round when Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. These last two entries are still non-consolidated democracies facing serious institutional problems and widespread corruption, but the expectation is that those would eventually be overcome. It is largely recognized that it was this long path to EU membership with its strict conditionality clauses (the so called Copenhagen criteria) -demanding from the applicant countries to establish a functioning democracy, respect for human rights, a market economy and adherence to the objectives of the EU – that provided the critical pressure and guidance to successfully transform the Eastern European countries. The only European post-communist countries still staying in limbo are the Yugoslav successor states, which with the exception of Slovenia and Croatia are yet to cope with the political aftershocks of the Yugoslav wars.

But what about the former Soviet Union? Has it fulfilled the democratic promises of the early 1990s? In the case of the 15 states emerging from the former Soviet Union, the picture is highly polarized. Of the 12 non-Baltic former Soviet republics, eight are brutal consolidated autocratic regimes with state-dominated semi-liberal economies. The most oppressive and tyrannical of those are the Central Asia republics or the so called 'stans': Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. With the vivid exception of Kyrgyzstan, all of the Central Asia republics are currently lead by presidents who have been in office since before the Soviet dissolution and simply exchanged their party leadership for the position of the presidency in the early 1990s. Nazarbayevin in Kazakhstan, Rahmonov in Tajikistan, Karimov in Uzbekistan and Niyazov "Turkmenbashi" in Turkmenistan (who died in 2006 and was replace by Berdymukhammedov) have all become dictators for life, in office for more than 20 years. The only glimmer of hope the region offers is Kyrgyzstan which following the Tulip Revolution of 2005 and a major popular uprising and a bloody ethnic conflict in the summer of 2010, has finally held new elections and passed a vote to become the first state with parliamentary form of government in the region.

Outside of Central Asia, three other former Soviet republics have in the last decade degenerated into fully dictatorial regimes. In Azerbaijan the Aliyev family has been running the country as its personal fiefdom since 1993 (first the father Heydar Aliyev, now his son Ilham Aliyev); in Belarus, "Europe's last dictator" Alexander Lukashenka just this last December won-reelection and a fourth term in office after 16 years of iron-fist rule. As the opposition organized rallies to oppose the manipulated elections, security forces rounded up the opposition and in a violent crackdown detailed over 600 people and charged all other former presidential candidates with organizing the post-election marches (if convicted of the charge, they could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison). It is very likely that Lukashenka would use this opportunity to jail the opposition leaders and rid himself of political challengers.

Even more intimidating have been the developments in the biggest remnant of the USSR- the Russian Federation itself. Under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1992-1999) Russia was a rather unstable and hectic but decentralized and partially democratic polity. Since the reigns of the state have passed to Vladimir Putin, -first as a president (2000-2008) and then as a prime minister under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, Russia has been transformed into a highly-centralized political hegemon with renewed geopolitical ambitions, a petrostate with an expanding resource base, presenting a major bulwark of authoritarianism in the Post-Soviet space and Asia.

In fact it now critically undermines the democracy chances of every other post-Soviet state outside of the Baltics. Its involvement in the Transdniester conflict helps keep Moldova split into two in a 'frozen' political impasse (Moldova is also the poorest country in Europe), and also emboldens Armenia in its dispute with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno- Karabakh. Moldova and Armenia are now classified as semi-consolidate authoritarian systems, meaning that compared to the states discussed earlier they still offer some minor space for political contestation and participation.

And finally, the only two countries that made a major leap across the post-USSR authoritarian quagmire and underwent 'Color Revolutions' in order to throw out their growingly authoritarian post-communist leaders- Georgia and Ukraine – have unfortunately also disappointed. The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2004 removed President Shevardnadze from power in a post- election mobilization campaign but its then opposition leader and current president Michael Saakashvili has been accused of 'superpresidentialism' and retreat on his democratization promises. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-2005, which removed president Kuchma and his anointed successor from power was reversed just this last year when this same successor, Victor Yanukovych, won the 2010 Ukraine presidential elections and quickly moved to undo the democratic achievements of the Orangists.

Overall, two decades after the fall of Communism the former Soviet republics, (with the exception of the Baltics) are again using brutal security forces, pliant courts, and tightly controlled news media to systematically crush political dissent. Even worse, as a reaction to the Color Revolutions, authoritarian backlash in these states had only intensified since 2005, getting harsher by the day. Journalists, dissidents, and opposition forces are facing even more brutal torture, deadly violence, and disappearances.

All optimism regarding the countries of the former USSR seems both futile and naïve. It seems even more so when examined within a wider international context. Currently, the EU is overextended and still adjusting to its new size – and largely unwilling to face further enlargement or engagements in the Balkans or in Post-Soviet space. The U.S. democracy promotion mission was discredited during the last Bush administration and even if it finds its new raison d'etre, the two wars in the Middle East and a lagging recovery would keep democracy abroad only as a marginal concern. Finally, and probably most critically, we are currently witnessing the creation of a new "Axis of Authoritarianism". It spreads from the eastern fringes of Europe to the outpost of Asia, bracketed by China and Russia and passing through most of Central Asia – a region which is becoming rapidly more economically powerful and politically more closed and oppressive.

In conclusion we can simply say than the European countries and the Baltic states have largely jumped over the authoritarian divide, the post-Yugoslav states are in between and the situation in the formers USSR republics is tremendously grim with no hopes of any positive change.