The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs

Turkey, a long-time NATO member and a key strategic ally of the United States in the Greater Middle East, has recently made a strong push for the creation of a Public Diplomacy Coordination Agency within the Prime Minister’s Office, placing increasingly higher value at attaining greater “soft power” that can directly or indirectly support Turkey’s foreign policy ("Circular: Coordinator of Public Diplomacy," 2010). The Armenian Genocide is among Turkey’s major foreign policy issues ("Main Foreign Policy Issues,"), and given the nature of the matter, it would certainly fall under the “public diplomacy” priorities as well, since Turkey has set out to counter the information campaigns carried out by the ethnic Armenian communities (mostly Diasporan) in their respective countries ("Armenian Allegations Concerning the 1915 Events: Turkey's Position," 2010). Hence, it can be said that it was largely due to the Turkish failure to respond adequately that currently more than 20 countries and many sub-national entities around the world have officially recognized the Armenian Genocide ("Armenian Allegations Concerning the 1915 Events: Turkey's Position," 2010). Not only does it deal a blow to Turkish national identity, but it also hampers the Republic’s relations with countries that do recognize the events as Genocide.

The proposed non-binding Resolution 252 (H. Res. 252) at the U.S. House of Representatives in March 2010 (2010), which recognized the events of the early 20^th century as Genocide and called upon the Administration to do the same, posed a new challenge for Turkey’s foreign policy. Since America is among its most important allies, if passed by the entire Congress, the Resolution would certainly deal a major blow to Turkish-American relations, and its foreign policy as a whole (CNN, 2010, March 4). On multiple occasions in the past, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs had passed such bills; however, it faced much greater opposition previously than it did this year, especially given the absence of pro-active support from the Obama administration (Yüksel, 2010). Somehow late to respond, the Turkish government gradually mobilized all its diplomatic capabilities – domestic and Diasporan – in early March to counter the Resolution at the Committee level, galvanize support from the general American public, and ensure the  backing of the U.S. administration to, at least, try and stop the bill from getting to a general Congressional vote.[1] This paper will use Zaharna’s Information-Relational frameworks to analyze and assess these immediate Turkish attempts, focusing on the late-February to early-March 2010 period.[2]

Information and Relational Frameworks

Public diplomacy, as defined by Paul Sharp is “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented” (Melissen, 2005, p. 8). Zaharna suggests that a cogent public diplomacy program comprises three major components: Grand Strategy, which sets the overarching policy or mission of the country; Strategies, which focus on promoting specific goals and policies within the Grand Strategy; and Tactics that provide the tools and means for implementing the Strategy. Nonetheless, to achieve success at all three dimensions, Zaharna also identifies two complementary models for strategic communication indispensable for any effective public diplomacy program: Information and Relational (Zaharna, 2010). The Information framework, which focuses on “the design and dissemination of messages to solve communication problems and advance political objectives”, builds on the transmission model of communication and targets key audiences with pre-selected messages. This perspective sees communication problems arising primarily from “insufficient, incomplete, or inaccurate information” (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 138-139). To address this problem, then, the communicator is prompted to increase the volume of information or attempts to alter the message design and delivery strategies, based on the assumption that “fixing the information shortcoming” would automatically resolve the communication problem, too. Hence, it is important to avoid distortions in the information transfer, ensuring directness and clarity (Zaharna, 2010).

Given the nature and the objective of this public diplomacy approach, there are several major features that need to be considered by the communicator. The first feature is the messaging strategy: there needs to be a well-formulated message, along with a strategic selection, structuring, and presentation of information that would achieve the desired effect (Zaharna, 2010, p. 140). This necessitates the attainment of control over the message – its design, integrity, and consistency – which the communicator can hold over time and over various platforms. Furthermore, Zaharna stresses the importance of the separation between the political sponsor of the communication initiative and the general public, which is construed as the “target audience” and plays a very passive role – if any at all – in the planning or implementation of the initiative, resulting in essentially one-way flow of communication. The latter also deems electronic and mass media means of message delivery as most appropriate channels, since they disseminate relatively large volumes of information to a large number of people within a short period of time. The last major feature of the Information model is the attempt to gauge the effectiveness of information initiatives through methods such as the quantification of information output, audience reach and attitude. Underlying all these features is the fundamental issue of credibility, which – especially in the current information and technological context – inevitably determines the persuasive value of any information initiative. Examples of Informational communication strategies can range from coercive information dissemination (e.g. propaganda), to vigorous advocacy (e.g. media relations, nation branding), to attempts to “disseminate unbiased information” (e.g. new broadcasts) (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 140-146).

The Relational framework, on the other hand, primarily focuses on “relationship-building and maintenance of social structures to solve communication problems to advance political objectives” (Zaharna, 2010, p. 146). This model sees its objective as being the very establishment and maintenance of a relationship – balancing levels of risk and trust – which provides the social context of connection, mutuality, and interdependence, and thus, enhances the ability of all involved parties to achieve their goals. Interpersonal communication is the ideal medium in the Relational framework, since its personal nature enhances its trustworthiness and makes it most effective for building and maintaining relationships. What is more, because of its rejection of the purely transmission mode of communication, the Relational framework relies on the circulation of information through a network of a multitude of active participants. This, in turn, necessitates a message that is resonant with the social context of that network and enhances cohesion within it (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 146-148).

One of the key components of the Relational model is the identification and building, where they are absent, of critical relationships, alleviating any causes for strained relations and expanding the existing positive ones. Successful relationship-building happens in contexts where commonalities and mutual interests are emphasized, thus giving prominence to the need to understand “other countries’ needs, cultures, and peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause” (Zaharna, 2010, p. 148). Another feature of the Relational model is the conscious avoidance of messaging strategies, and the focus on actions and symbolic gestures demonstrating reciprocity, trust, and commitment. This also necessitates emphasis on active participation and a view of communication as a process where participants cultivate connections and coordinate actions spanning across all levels of the society (from political leaders to the general public), as opposed to seeing communication as a mere product. In terms of communication channels, the Relational model starts off with interpersonal links facilitating direct interaction, gradually expanding to involve many more participants. Communication from prominent members or political leaders in this framework should be regarded not in terms of information transmission, but rather as a means to reinforce the relationship. Lastly, it is important to focus on the continuity and the sustainability of the relationship, ensuring its durability and strength over time, and exhibiting long-term links, interaction, and expanding cooperation across all level of the public. Examples within the Relational model of strategic communication include cultural and educational exchanges, various bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects and organizations. However, because of its nature, the Relational model is even more difficult to quantify and measure, and given the “result-driven” component of policy-making and its prioritization of short-term achievements, this approach – on its own – is often seen as limited and unviable in international affairs (Zaharna, 2010, pp. 146-152).

Nevertheless, to be successful, both these models should be implemented together, as they both have mutually supporting and reinforcing components that can only enhance the effectiveness of the public diplomacy strategy. Turkey seems to have employed this approach in the case of the H. Res. 252, combining both models in trying to engage already existing relational and advocacy links, while launching an information initiative involving an intensive campaign.

The Relational Approach

The Turkish Public Diplomacy Agency, that started its work in 2008, had set out to use a range of instruments, including publications, seminars, television programs, movie production, and think tanks to advance its goals. As Turkey’s Foreign Minister had stated then, “[The agency] will cooperated with establishments, like think tanks and foundations, and will try to influence public perceptions about Turkey through them” ("Government goes on public diplomacy offensive," 2008, April 28).

Thus, attention should firstly be focused at the Relational aspect of Turkish public diplomacy. Turkey, given the relatively significant size and organization of its ethnic community within the United States, relies heavily on its Diaspora for its public diplomacy, especially when it comes to associative communication with the larger American public. Living and working in the U.S., Turkish-Americans would be much more likely to have their own existing networks (or, in case of lack thereof, they might have greater chances and ease of creating those), which they can use to enact the public diplomacy of Turkey itself: in this case, for the purpose of blocking the Armenian Genocide Resolution. Hence, the efforts were not limited to those of the Turkish Government only, as organizations such as the Turkish-American Action Committee or the Turkish Coalition of America, which already have non-Turkish members including current and former members of Congress, were actively mobilized.[3] That, in itself, is arguably an essential component of the Relational public diplomacy approach, since ethnic, cultural, historical, financial, and political links made the two sides organic partners in achieving shared goals through reciprocity, symbolic ties, sustained commitments, and generated trust.

In analyzing the engagement of the American nods in the network, the focus should certainly fall on the Congress and those involved in advocacy, as well as on the actions of the Turkish-American organizations. Hence, members of the Congressional Turkish Caucus[4] joined the efforts to lobby against the Resolution, and their success can be demonstrated by the fact that the Resolution was passed by a very narrow margin, 23-22, stopping at the Committee Level (Yüksel, 2010). Another set of partners opposing the motion were the American defense and security companies – Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, United Technologies and Northrop Grumman among them – who have major interests involved in the military cooperation with Turkey, and are certainly major stakeholders in a strong Turkish-American relationship (Eggen, 2010, March 4). The chief executives of these companies were also encouraged to weigh in, to support Turkey’s interests on the Hill.

And lastly, the Turkish state made its contribution by sending its Grand National Assembly members of the Turkey-USA Parliamentary Friendship Group[5] to Washington to make their case in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee ("Visiting Turkish Parliamentarians Offered Perspective on House Resolution," 2010). What is more, the delegation also attempted to directly engage the U.S. Administration by evoking the ties developed through the security (primarily, NATO) and economic partnership developed over the past decades ("U.S. vows bid to halt Armenian genocide measure," 2010). The latter attempt was an apparent success, since the Obama administration did try to weigh in at the very last moment, by calling on the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman to hold off the vote, and later, by vowing to block the Resolution’s further advance ("U.S. vows bid to halt Armenian genocide measure," 2010). And yet another indication of the Relational approach was the fact that Turkey recalled Namık Tan, its Ambassador to the U.S., upon the Committee’s passage of the Resolution: it was a symbolic gesture to underscore Turkish discontent with the move, which, it considered as a break of the mutuality, trust, and commitment that initially existed between the two countries ("Statement by the Turkish Government about H. Res. 252," 2010). Therefore, there was a lot of emphasis on the mutuality aspect of the relationship and the interdependence of the two nations, especially in the sphere of defense and security.

The Information Approach

The Turkish Government, as well as its Diasporan partners within the United States, made extensive use of Information strategies, not only through immediate messaging initiatives, but also through maintaining a degree of consistent engagement of various efforts to prevent the recognition, even after the vote itself ("Turkish Lobby Distributes Brochures in Washington DC Against Armenian Allegations," 2010, March 23). Hence, within its Grand Strategy of promoting Turkey as a modern, liberal, Western-style democracy (which included the resistance to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, which would undermine its image and national identity), the focus in this case was on the specific strategy of countering the passage of the H. Res. 252 through strategic public communication of targeted, persuasive messages. The problem was perceived in terms of the lack of “truthful” information about the events and the issue, itself. Hence, the Turkish state and its Diasporan partners opted for the provision of this information to the American public, as well as their representatives in Congress, via interpersonal, lobbying, and mass media channels.

The overarching theme within the Information methods was discrediting the Armenian-American information campaigns and tactics, pointing to the need for a historical – and not political – discussion of the issue, as well as highlighting the adverse effects the Resolution could have on the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which was supported by the U.S. (Sheridan, 2010, March 5). More importantly, however, the key messages seemed to be emphasizing the significance of the strategic alliance between the United States and Turkey, particularly within the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Yüksel, 2010).

The primary audience, most certainly, were those members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs who were considered potential swing voters on the issue, as well as their publics, to ensure the backing of their constituents: the Turkish Coalition of America was reported to be specifically active in this respect, also submitting op-eds to local newspapers (Eggen, 2010, March 4). Secondary audience, in this regard, would be the other members of the Foreign Affairs committee specifically, as well as the Congress at large – along with their respective constituent publics – since, they could potentially be the ultimate decision-makers on the issue ("Turkish Lobby Distributes Brochures in Washington DC Against Armenian Allegations," 2010, March 23). And lastly, the Turkish side also tried influencing the general American public through print media coverage – there were several articles titled along the lines of “But Who Needs Allies? Congress poisons U.S.-Turkey relations”[6] – as well as online, by posting articles and news updates on the websites of some of the Turkish-American web-projects.[7]

Here, the one-page “appeal” to all members of Congress published in the March 3, 2010 Washington Post, deserves special mention. It appeared on the A7 page, and clearly outlined the major messages that the Turkish side wanted to communicate:

“…The resolution legislates history and imposes a conviction by enforcing a once-sided interpretation of the tragedies that befell many in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. It commits a profound injustice against those seeking the truth. […]  We are further concerned that House Resolution 252 could adversely impact relations between the US and Turkey, who enjoy a “model partnership”. Our vital alliance upholds regional and global peace, security, and prosperity. The resolution could complicate Turkish-Armenian relations and thus impair the delicate normalization process between the two countries. […] Support reconciliation, not the legislation of history.”

Published a day before the vote, this “advertisement”/appeal targeted not only the Congress members, but also clearly articulated the stance of the Turkish side, eventually trickling down to media coverage by other outlets that followed on March 4 and March 5.[8] Thus, choosing one of the most (if not the most) prominent American publication, Turkey managed to put its point across not only to the direct readers of the Washington Post, but to all of the American (as well as international) media audiences.

Partnerships in this case, as already noted above, can be analyzed on various dimensions. There were clear cooperation links between the Turkish state and the Diaspora, the latter two and the Turkish Congressional Caucus, all of them and several major security companies, as well as between all of the above and the Obama Administration (CNN, 2010, March 6). These partnerships attempted to utilize their own existing links, as well as traditional media channels, providing a counter-argument to the Armenian-American stance, and by trying to influence the message at various levels of the political discourse, from print and broadcast media to in-Congress discussions.

Assessment and Recommendations

From the discussion above it can be construed that the Turkish side in the battle over the H. Res. 252 attempted a semi-holistic approach, by engaging both models of public diplomacy outlined by Zaharna: Information and Relational. They tried combining the existing relational networks and links (or building those, where they were absent) at various levels of the U.S. government, and provided much more visibility to the counter-Armenian argument through mass media channels not only among Congressional members, but also their constituents and the public at large. Whether this public diplomacy initiative can be considered a success, is a matter of argument, since although the Foreign Affairs Committee passed the Resolution, it did so only through one vote, while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it clear that despite that fact, the Administration opposes the recognition ("Clinton reaffirms opposition to genocide resolution," 2010, March 30). What is more, despite the passage, she expressed hope that the Turkish Ambassador will return to Washington, D.C., reiterating the high value of the Turkish-American relationship ("US hopes Turkey will return ambassador," 2010, March 29).

Nevertheless, there is much that Turkey can learn in terms of conducting successful public diplomacy from this experience. For the purposes of this paper, public diplomacy was conceptualized not only in its usual form as dealing directly with the publics, but also as reaching out to decision-makers who represent them, given the gradual convergence of traditional and public diplomacy. Turkey successfully managed to draw up and strategically place themes and messages, and played traditional lobbying-politics and partnership-building, to ensure the relative success that it achieved.

And yet, Turkey could have had less trouble in this specific case, had its efforts been organized and carried out better. Turkey needs to do much more in engaging the American public more effectively, which will, indirectly, also provide the law-makers with constituents that are far more willing to accept the Turkish argument over that of the Armenian one on this issue. To be most effective, Turkey needs to ensure that its Relational tactics are strongly in place and well-functional, and do span across all levels of societies on both ends – Turkish and American. This, in turn, can provide greater credibility and more success when urgent objectives, such as stopping the H. Res. 252, arise. Thus, although long-term efforts were beyond the scope of this paper, strengthening of this aspect of public diplomacy along with relationship-building, sustained engagement, and a more streamlined focus on a Grand Strategy would certainly provide most effective access points for shorter-term, strategic communication tactics. The Turkish side has already managed to establish certain Turkish-American organizations, advocacy groups, permanent partnerships, student exchanges, and web-projects;[9] however, it needs to be more engaged in connecting with the wider American public, especially when it comes to garnering support regarding specific political issues.

In order to do that, Turkey needs to establish Relations networks – even if indirect and dispersed – making use of the currently available social media, for example, to make the communication process more interpersonal and interactive, and provide a popular forum for political discussion, that is so vital as times of “crisis”.[10] Organizations’ websites need to provide selective subscription options, as well as more news and op-ed content in English, for non-Turkish speaking audiences. In terms of think-tanks – a part of the Foreign Ministry’s outlined public diplomacy strategy – the SETA Foundation,[11] for example, has become fairly prominent in the policy and academic circles, despite being young. And yet, throughout the increased “campaigning” days, SETA held no events or prominent discussions to capture attention. A good strategy would have been to hold at least one event with the participation of some of the Congressional Turkey Caucus members, several of the visiting Turkish Parliamentarians, as well as a prominent academic or a researcher. That way, they would ensure further media coverage, and since they would be the ones formulating and framing the debate, the event would have provided another opportunity for getting the desired message to the target audiences, as shaped by the Turkish side.

Furthermore, Turkey needs to keep building strategic networks and maintaining a consistent flow of information and communication, not only to political leaders, but also to the general public. It needs to make the issue a matter of everyday significance – and not limit it to March-April every year (April 24 is the Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day), or the election period – constantly making its case through rational, well-supported, non-defamatory and unsensational arguments. Such an approach, coupled with other long-term strategies, will help the Turkish side to establish a credible voice and hence, provide greater leverage when short-term, immediate tactics need to be employed, and when there is a pressing need to influence public opinion and political decision-making.

References

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Sheridan, M. B. (2010, March 5). No plans for House to vote on Armenian genocide resolution, aide says. Washington Post, from http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/no-plans-for-house-to-vote-on.html?wprss=44

Statement by the Turkish Government about H. Res. 252. (2010). Washington, D.C., March 4: Embassy of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, http://www.washington.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=2232.

Turkish Lobby Distributes Brochures in Washington DC Against Armenian Allegations. (2010, March 23). Turkish NY, from http://www.washington.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=2232

U.S. vows bid to halt Armenian genocide measure. (2010). Reuters, from http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6244I220100305?type=politicsNews

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USHR. (2010). H. Res. 252: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution. from http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1156&show=votes

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Zaharna, R. S. (2010). Battles to Bridges: U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.