The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs

In recent years a line of research has attempted to explain the development of moderate Islam in Turkey within the greater framework of the interaction between religion and politics. Many observers of Turkish political life have argued that secular foundations of Turkey have been significantly challenged since the 1970s and tensions between secularists and “Islamists” reached apogee during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). For some of them, moderate Islam practiced in Turkey became a two-edged sword: while serving as an effective tool in helping to rescue the society from inefficiencies of the “old” regime, Turkey’s status as a “model” for other regional states may soon be discarded if the idea of moderate Islam spreads excessively or suddenly radicalizes.

Many indeed believe that religious conservatism in Turkey may not remain moderate for long without checks and balances and truly secular opposition. This essay argues that the above approach is too hostile to objective inquiry in several ways. Contemporary advocates of secular life and politics in Turkey harshly criticize the ruling party and argue for a democracy that observes a complete separation of religious practice and the state. However, such an understanding of democracy and freedom may be too restrictive and lacking significant elements required for a functioning of a liberal regime in the changing social context of that part of the world.

It is hard not to agree with those who claim that Turkey benefits from its unique status within Islamic world as a secularized, Muslim democratic state. The richness and diversity of its cultural mosaic, its geographic location on the crossroads of East and West, the North and the South, and its historical links with the Greek, Roman, and the Ottoman Empire, which, in fact, ruled the Muslim world for over four centuries, all contribute to its universal uniqueness that helps Turkey to advance its international agenda. In that sense some might agree with the statement that the AKP government baldly exploits universal concepts of tolerance, peace, and coexistence, and turns the debate over Turkey’s potential role as a linking bridge between different civilizations, in the general context of EU accession, into a political tool which grants the AKP a legitimacy to survive in Turkey’s Kemalist political environment. Indeed, AKP increased its global credibility and managed to advance its own domestic political agenda by repeatedly reaffirming its EU commitment and presenting Turkey as a praiseworthy example of a state with embedded traditions of democracy, secularism, religiosity, and moderation both at home and on the international arena. In part, because of its ability to maintain such a balance under relatively functioning democratic regime, within 5-6 years the AKP has developed into a popular political model and a splendid example for imitation to the Muslim world.

It is probably also true that many share a concern over dangers of the over-reliance on a dominant-party system. With very few exceptions, historically, dominant-party system has been a dangerous path to follow. In its most severe form, the lack of checks and balances may lead to erosion of liberal norms, censorship of alternative ideas, abuse of authority, and may gradually transform a managed electoral process into a dictatorship. During past several years AKP has occupied about two thirds of the seats in the Turkish parliament and managed to bring the party’s presidential candidate to power. Indeed, it seems that there is a legitimate base for general suspicion. However, there is more disagreement on several other points.

Students of Turkish politics vary in their understanding of the historical context behind socioeconomic reforms performed in Turkey by the AKP. Many argue that in the recent past the Turkish state provided a framework for political mobilization but most of them fail to address the reasons that led to political upheaval. Unfortunately, it is true that the Turkish state and its military since 1923 have not been able to or, may be, were unwilling to sustain egalitarian ideals and traditional patterns of social relations. Particularly intolerant the system appeared to be toward its own Muslim majority. Establishment of institutional limits on political career opportunities for practitioners of Islam and consequences of military coups present a strong evidence of discrimination against the rights of the religious portion of the population. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire granted much greater powers and freedom to its citizens than we see in early Republican Turkey.

Finally, contrary to widespread stereotyping, the AKP barely fits the image of a Muslim Democrat party. Probably, much better it presents an image of a unifying centrist party that gets electoral support from all segments of the society across the country. The Turkish prime minister and leader of the AKP, Erdogan, refused various descriptions and repeatedly stated that his party supported a liberal regime based on laicism. Many of the AKP officials have also rejected their ties with earlier Islamist parties in Turkish history and referred to the Justice and Development Party as a conservative democratic party. In this sense, the attempts to draw parallels between Erdogan’s AKP and Erbakan’s Welfare Party are misguided in several ways. The AKP leaders’ previous association with the Welfare Party does not prove the causality of AKP’s so-called Islamism. Looking at the AKP’s own discourse and performance, the Justice and Development Party cannot be regarded as even mildly Islamist. Rather, it seems to be a party aimed at preserving traditional cultural values and advocating liberal tenets in politics. As of today, it is safe to say that the AKP has made a serious bid to be considered an initiator of the most liberal reforms in Turkish history since the establishment of the Republic. Contrary to widespread accusations, the AKP has never attempted to install or even discussed the possibility of adopting Sharia law. It has never discussed the option of taking a legislative action in order to make the wearing of headscarves mandatory for women and only with support and encouragement of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) the AKP discussed the possibility of lifting the headscarf ban in universities. Similarly, their attempt to change the university entrance examination regulations was motivated by the popular will to end the discrimination against graduates of Imam-Hatip and vocational schools run under the supervision of state authorities. Eventually, it is important to understand that almost entire Turkish political elite, including AKP leaders, have abandoned Islamism by all means because they became aware that Islamism promoted by Welfare Party proved unsuccessful and a great deal of the Turkish society will hardly ever embrace Islamism per se again.

Many who have a personal experience of living in Turkey and engaging with people from many diverse backgrounds in recent years can confirm the tremendous change going on in Turkish society. Probably we should pay more attention to political consciousness among population groups that has developed considerably and leads to active citizens who are aware of their rights and already question the “conventional” order of the society. Therefore, it is probably true that the pessimistic approach to the Turkey’s internal dilemma needs to be reassessed with a view to taking the social maturity and the changing popular will into consideration.

Bulat Akhmetkarimov

Ph.D. Candidate at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, bakhmet1@jhu.edu