The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs

The electoral revolutions that swept through former communist states in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space in the late 1990s and early 2000s initially provoked great optimism regarding the democratic potential for the region. Advocates of democracy promotion both in the political sphere and in academia considered these so-called “color revolutions” a source of political inspiration[1] as well as learning opportunity from which ideas for future democracy promotion could be gleaned.[2] However, the regimes that emerged from these recent electoral revolutions are far from uniformly democratic. While what might usefully be termed the “fifth wave” of transitions cannot be said to result in “democracy and dictatorship” as Michael McFaul characterized the fourth wave’s post-communist outcomes,[3] these electoral revolutions produced regimes that span a spectrum between democracy and authoritarianism.

Lisel Hintz is a fourth year PhD student of Political Science at George Washington University, with a focus on the impact of contestation of national identity in domestic politics on foreign policy. Her regional areas of interest are Turkey, countries of the former Yugoslavia, and post-Soviet states. She developed and taught a graduate level course on The State, Nationalism, and Identity at the University of Kent's Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS), currently serves as Teaching Assistant in the fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics at GWU, and has presented her work at annual conventions of the International Studies Association and Midwest Political Science Association. Her studies and research tool acquisition have been funded by GWU's Institute for Middle East Studies; Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; and the US State Department's Critical Language Scholarship. She speaks Spanish, French, German, and Turkish and looks forward to learning more.

States such as Serbia (Serbia-Montenegro at the time of its 2000 revolution) have been relatively successful in institutionalizing adherence to democratic norms and procedures, while states such as Georgia, and Ukraine proved decidedly less successful in transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy. Thus, while McFaul elsewhere refers to the electoral revolutions of Serbia-Montenegro, Georgia, and Ukraine as cases of “successful democratic breakthrough,”[4] of these three, only Serbia could be considered a successful democratic outcome. What accounts for this puzzling divergence?

This article argues that the lack of cohesion among elites leading the electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine substantially shaped the outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule following these electoral revolutions. Without the cohesion necessary to resolve intra-elite disputes over policy and power-sharing, elites previously willing to work together toward winning power no longer shared a common goal. Thus, the loose coalitions that led the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine split shortly after coming to power, leaving democratic vacuums in their wake: the regimes of these three states currently represent relatively unconstrained presidentialism and the electoral success of a former authoritarian leader, respectively. In the case of Serbia, the elites leading the electoral revolution demonstrated higher degrees of cohesion that enabled their newly institutionalized leadership to withstand significant shocks – such as the assassination of Serbian President Zoran Djindjic in 2003 – and still maintain a stable democratic regime. Simply put, in a transition in which a high degree of cohesion among elites was present prior to the electoral revolution, the regime produced in the transition from authoritarianism was more democratic; conversely, those revolutions led by elites who were loosely united behind the sole purpose of achieving electoral victory tended to produce “hybrid regimes,” which retained elements of authoritarian rule.[5] Even more simply put, and with a plea for forgiveness from Barrington Moore: no cohesion, no democracy.[6]

In structuring the argument explaining why democracy failed to emerge from electoral revolutions ousting authoritarian leaders in Georgia and Ukraine, the paper begins with a brief discussion of case selection, including the reason for why the country in the region that offers the best support for this argument – Kyrgyzstan – is excluded from this study. Next, in order to provide an explanation of the failure to transition to democratize in these “fifth wave” revolutions, the third section outlines the concept of elite cohesion. This section provides a clear definition of cohesion in terms of shared commitments to long-term goals – as opposed to the short-term goal of electoral victory. The section then explores the role that cohesion plays in preventing intra-coalition disputes from escalating to the point of elite rupture or defection. With a definition of cohesion and an understanding of its role in dispute settlement in place, the paper investigates levels of elite cohesion in the two cases, finding elite cohesion to be minimal in Georgia and Ukraine. The third section then presents evidence in support of the claim that the current regime in each of these states is far from one that could be considered a successful democratic outcome of a transition. To provide variation on the dependent variable, the paper then undertakes a brief investigation of the earlier electoral revolution in Serbia in which the regime outcome was democratic in order to determine whether elite cohesion existed in this case. The temporal element is key here, as it will be suggested that the fact that a successful model was available to be copied and used by opposition elite in later electoral revolutions may explain why the revolution was successful, but that the very brief time for opposition elite to develop cohesion before implementing this model explains why these transitions to democracy were unsuccessful. Following a similar logic, the role of external democracy assistance funding in facilitating electoral revolutions before opposition elite developed cohesion will also be explored. What may be favorable conditions for an electoral revolution[7] may not be the same conditions favorable for transitioning to democracy. The paper concludes with reflections on the generalizability of this argument for cases such as the recent Arab revolutions, avenues for further study of regime dynamics, and potential policy implications of paper’s findings for the future of democracy promotion.

Case study selection and an alternative explanation

This universe of cases for this paper is selected based on three stipulating criteria that deserve explication. In order to hold as many factors constant as possible, the analysis examines electoral revolutions, which are defined as mass peaceful protests against the stealing of an election by an incumbent and spearheaded by a group that successfully takes power in the ensuing election.[8] This criterion therefore excludes from consideration the 1998 election defeat of Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia and opposition’s 2000 victory over Franco Tudjman in Croatia. As both Meciar and Tudjman conceded defeat in these elections, no mass protest erupted to contest the outcome and thus no elites united under the prospect of imminent access to power.[9]

Secondly, the cases selected reflect outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule in which the norms and rules for the practice of politics are relatively settled. Following Thomas Carothers’ argument that it is often most useful to view regimes in the middle of the spectrum of democracy and authoritarianism not as merely unconsolidated democracies in the “delayed” process of transition, but rather as political phenomena with distinct properties to be studied in their own right, this paper investigates the regimes of Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine as outcomes to be explained rather than as “way stations” in transition.[10] This criterion excludes the case of Kyrgyzstan from consideration, given the recent violent coup, clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, and the recent extension of the interim government.[11] Nevertheless, the political situation in Kyrgyzstan at the time of writing is in line with the main argument of this paper. The highly disparate elites leading the Tulip Revolution held nothing more in common than short-term patronage interests,[12] demonstrating no cohesive elements whatsoever; perhaps most illustrative of this lack of cohesion is the fact that the coup to overthrow President Kurmanbek Bakiev – installed by the Tulip Revolution – was led by Roza Otunbayeva – a key opposition elite and Bakiev “ally” during the Tulip Revolution.[13]

Finally, the analysis here is limited to electoral revolutions in postcommunist states, again so as to hold as many factors constant as possible. While not an ideal “laboratory,”[14] as Serbia-Montenegro did not experience Soviet rule as did Georgia and Ukraine, holding the region, time period, and former political institutions constant provides a useful method of examining the role of oppositional elite cohesion in regime outcomes of transitions. Brief reflections on whether these arguments may be generalized outside of the post-Soviet space are presented in the conclusion. Having made explicit the choices behind case selection in the study, the paper now considers a potentially powerful alternative explanation for the non-democratic outcomes present in Georgia and Ukraine. McFaul argues that the Georgia’s border disputes with Russia over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the ethnic conflict between those regions and Georgia accounts for the emergence of a postcommunist regime which was only a partial democracy, despite the fact that democratic opposition led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia overwhelmingly took power in the first election. As these border disputes and ethnic conflict persist today, one could argue that such de-stabilization has prevented a more democratic regime from emerging in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. A similar argument could be used in the case of Ukraine, which has its own bitter border disputes. While a long-standing dispute between Ukraine and Russia over access to the Asov Sea was tensely resolved in 2004,[15] Ukraine continues to dispute a vital Black Sea border with Romania; both parties contested the case at the International Court of Justice in 2008.[16] Ukraine, like Georgia, is also plagued by “tremendously explosive” conflict among Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, and Crimean Tatars in Ukraine’s Crimea region.[17]

Perhaps, then, it is the presence of border disputes and ethnic conflict in both states which has prevented the emergence of democracy following supposedly democratizing electoral revolutions. However, Serbia provides a strong counterexample to this argument. The contentious ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians – handled with extraordinary violence under Slobodan Milosevic’s rule – and the disputed territorial status of Kosovo remain even after Milosevic’s ouster, but violence is no longer used as form of repression and moderate, pro-EU parties have had electoral success. The February 3, 2008 election of pro-Western Boris Tadic as president over nationalist Tomaslav Nikolic – particularly as this victory came in anticipation of Kosovo’s February 17, 2008 declaration of independence – was seen to augur well for democratic prospects in the country.[18] While Serbia has not accepted Kosovo’s claim to sovereignty and continues to consider the territory a province of Serbia, this dispute does not seem to have caused any backsliding away from democracy within Serbia, which receives consistently higher Freedom House scores for both political rights and civil liberties than either Georgia or Ukraine.[19] Thus, the presence of ethnic tensions and borders disputes does not provide an adequate explanation for why democracy has failed to emerge in Georgia and Ukraine.

The factor that was overwhelmingly present in the Serbian case, but was absent in the electoral revolutions of Georgia and Ukraine, is that of elite cohesion in terms of shared commitment to long-term goals. While the temporary coalition of elites in both countries was sufficiently united to generate an electoral revolution, the lack of cohesion amongst elites that could provide incentives for dispute resolution within the coalition rather than defection led to coalition breakdown and, as a result, undemocratic outcomes. A discussion of the role oppositional cohesion among elites can thus play in transitions from authoritarian rule is presented in the next section.

Considering cohesion

Existing literature on the breakdown or persistence of authoritarian regimes devotes extensive attention to the role of elite cohesion in these two divergent outcomes. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, for example, discuss lack of cohesion in terms of the split between hard-liners and soft-liners. This split – generally created by disagreements over the desirability and realistic prospects of maintaining current forms of rule – creates an opening of political space for negotiation opportunities with the opposition, potentially leading to a transition away from authoritarian rule.[20] Splits may also occur when electoral competition creates “exit option” incentives for members of the ruling elite, rupturing the cohesion previously ensured by patronage.[21] Focusing on elements of inter-institutional cohesion in authoritarian regimes, Lucan Way argues that a lack of civil-military cohesion may impair a leader’s capacity to repress opposition protest and thus leave it vulnerable to toppling.[22] While these arguments provide compelling insight into the mechanisms that might lead to such outcomes as pacted transitions, hegemonic party split, or precisely the electoral revolutions discussed by Way that generated so much initial optimism, they do not address the role of elite cohesion in the outcome of the transition. Nor do they intend to. Indeed, O’Donnell and Schmitter are explicit in their argument that, while transitions may take place, outcomes are by no means uniformly democratic.[23] Rather than contest the arguments made above, this paper seeks to build on these insights, suggesting that the concept of elite cohesion – in this case among the opposition – can usefully be employed in analyzing the divergent outcomes of transitions from authoritarianism.

One case made by Nicholas van de Walle that addresses the role of opposition cohesion and transitions from authoritarian regimes is worthy of note here, as the issue raised in its introduction suggests that opposition cohesion is key to successful democratic transitions and thus may seem to overlap with the argument presented in this paper. However, what van de Walle describes as transition is more usefully termed electoral victory, as his question is whether broad-based opposition coalitions are effective in bringing about opposition victory at the polls.[24] Following O’Donnell and Schmitter’s lead, this paper considers a transition as referring to the interim period in between regimes when new institutions are being developed,[25] with the outcome of the transition being the settlement upon new rules and norms for the conduct of politics as noted above. Further, van de Walle’s subject of inquiry focuses on the “tipping point” for elite defection from the incumbent regime based on the level of mass support for the opposition and thus the chance of electoral victory rather than shared and binding commitments among elites. The term “opposition cohesion” thus seems ill-fitted for van de Walle’s purposes.

Conceptual clarity when analyzing the nature of relations within an opposition movement is therefore necessary. This paper defines cohesion among opposition elite as the presence of a commitment to shared principles and policy goals beyond that of achieving electoral victory. Cohesion may include shared foreign policy orientations, shared commitment to democracy and what institutional form that democracy should take in terms of power-sharing and, most importantly, a long term commitment to cooperation. Elites divided over foreign policy orientation, for example, may easily be split by the advances of another regime; this proved to be a source of the demise of Ukraine’s Orange Coalition. While the Orange Coalition was officially dissolved following the February 2010 presidential election of Viktor Yanukovich – precisely the individual the Orange Revolution successfully ousted – internal divides over relations with Russia within the coalition split leaders Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko long before, with the latter much more engaged with Russia.[26]

A group commitment to power-sharing is also a vital component of cohesion. If elites within the coalition do not feel that their interests are consistently underrepresented or that they may not have a turn in a position of political power, elites may defect from a democratic coalition just as they might from an authoritarian regime of cadres.[27] Various parties in Georgia that united in their opposition to the existing and vastly unpopular Shevardnadze regime formed only a “temporary and partial coalescence.”[28] This coalition, driven more by personality than issue or ideology, was able to mobilize enough support to win the election overwhelmingly but did not develop cohesion in terms of long-term shared goals. The subsequent defection from and vehement criticism of Saakashvili’s government by former members of the Georgian opposition coalition including Levan Gachechiladze and former Prime Minister Nino Burjanadze demonstrate the fragility of the Rose Revolution’s opposition coalition. Criticism by these former allies that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was increasingly ignoring voices from within his own coalition was frequent, especially in the November 2007 crackdown on protestors and the 2008 August War with Russia as discussed in the following section. Similar to Tymoshenko, part of Burjanadze’s split from Saakashvili may be explained by her efforts to develop amicable relations with Russia – or in Russia’s efforts to garner her future partnership. Even as Prime Minister, and in direct opposition to the aggressive stance taken by Saakashvili, observers viewed Burjanadze meeting on friendly terms with many prominent Russian politicians and making “very good connections”[29] that may serve her well in challenging Saakashvili as head of her own Democratic Movement for United Georgia.

Returning to Ukraine, the “broad-based political umbrella coalition” of the Committee for National Salvation loosely united numerous diverse movements in opposition to the candidacy and falsified victory of then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.[30] The numerous clashes among former allies Yushchenko and Tymoshenko over power-sharing are brought into stark relief by assessment of Yushchenko’s governance by Tymoshenko as “a dictatorship of stupidity, irresponsibility, and chaos” speak volumes to the splits within the formerly “united” opposition.[31] As McFaul notes, in Ukraine it was the “perception of unity” rather than actual elite cohesion that brought the coalition electoral success;[32] “perception of unity,” however, is less successful in resolving intra-party disputes over fundamental issues of governance and interest representation.

In sum, neither elites within the National Movement in Georgia nor within the Orange Coalition in Ukraine demonstrated significant willingness to cooperate with each other once in power. With little in common to bind them together in pursuit of institutionalizing democratic norms and procedures, the intra-coalitional disputes over policy and power-sharing split, leaving democratic vacuums in their place. Just as the “unity” of the opposition in both Georgia and Ukraine was short-lived, so was the success of each country’s transition to democracy. In short, the condition of presenting a united front when challenging an incumbent falsely claiming electoral victory was present for achieving an electoral revolutions in both cases, but the element of elite cohesion vital for producing democratic outcomes was not. Thus, while such countries demonstrated “significant improvement in democratic performance after the election,”[33] this improvement did not prove to be long-lived. The following section presents material to support this claim.

No Cohesion, No Democracy: Political outcomes in Georgia and Ukraine

The section explores the current regimes in two postcommunist states that have experienced electoral revolutions but have failed to transition to democracy from authoritarianism.[34] While optimism ran high for the democratic prospects of both Georgia and Ukraine, neither country can be considered to be fully democratic. Defining what constitutes a democratic regime and identifying one in practice is a formidable challenge for scholars given the immense variation in norms, institutions, and procedures within states. Progress has been made in moving beyond dichotomous categorizations of regimes as democratic and non-democratic to consider regimes along an analytical spectrum of “hybrid” regimes as discussed above. However, in differentiating between various forms of hybrid regimes, scholars risk overcomplicating their theoretical frameworks and making them impracticable for analysis. Recognizing the limitations of relying on scores derived from Freedom House reports, this paper does so, but supplements the scores with illustrative empirical material.

Beginning with Georgia, Saakashvili’s own words, as well as reports from internal critics and international non-governmental organizations provide more than sufficient information that Saakashvili runs his regime more as an unconstrained autocrat than as a democratic leader. At a public news briefing on January 12, 2004, Saakashvili advised his Justice Minister "to use force when dealing with any attempt to stage prison riots, and to open fire, shoot to kill and destroy any criminal who attempts to cause turmoil. We will not spare bullets against these people."[35] Georgia’s ombudsman for human rights, Sozar Subari, is and has been a long-time critic of the president,[36] and Freedom House scores measuring political rights and civil liberties have – after initial gains – fallen during his presidency as he decreased the legislative scope to reduce checks and balances on executive authority. By 2006, Saakashvili enjoyed “more formal power than Shevardnadze ever did,” and Georgia had a “less independent media and fewer opposition voices” than before Saakashvili’s ostensibly democratically-inspired Rose Revolution.[37] The 2006 Freedom House Country Report for Georgia notes that, despite some improvements following the Rose Revolution such as an increase in the provision of public goods, Georgia experienced “setbacks in the democratic balance of power.”[38] Further setbacks occurred with the violent crackdown on protestors and the state of emergency imposed by Saakashvili in December 2007. Georgia’s National Democratic Governance score declines from 4.5 in 2000 under Shevardnadze to 5.75 under Saakashvili in 2008, a significant step and one which is arguably indicative of backsliding.[39] Some have even argued that the media is less independent and the opposition voices fewer in number than under Shevardnadze.[40] Georgia is thus assessed in 2009 as “partly free,” with scores of 4 for both political rights and civil liberties which demonstrates a significant decline from scores of 3 for both in 2007.[41]

Turning to the case of Ukraine, Freedom House reports from 2008 grant Ukraine a composite national democracy score of 4.25 with a local democratic a score of 5.25.[42] Overall, Ukraine receives 3 for political rights and 2 for civil liberties and is thus assessed as “free.” Ukraine is plagued, however, by corruption, particularly at the local level, receiving a 5.75. Ukraine’s local democratic governance score declined from 4.75 in 2000 under Kuchma to 5.25 in 2008 under Yushchenko.[43] As noted above, Ukraine has experienced significant political instability and the breakdown of the ruling coalition due to infighting among former allies. The election of Viktor Yanukovich seems to undermine the very goals of the Orange Revolution as he was the candidate whose fraudulent electoral victory the revolution challenged. Under Yanukovich, Ukraine’s foreign policy has taken a “dramatic U-turn” back toward Russia, a country which perhaps best exemplifies Larry Diamond’s concept of “democratic rollback.”[44] Former Russian president and current prime minister Vladimir Putin’s recent actions to appoint formerly elected regional governors and raise the minimum threshold for party representation in parliament from 5% to 7% demonstrate a significant centralization of power that served to monopolize regional political space[45] while his regime’s intimidation (and many argue elimination) of those who voice criticism leaves little room for the development of meaningful political opposition or civil society.[46] Yanukovich’s shift back towards Russia may be seen as indicative of future authoritarian tendencies at home.

In both Georgia and Ukraine, the regime outcomes following electoral revolutions and transitions from authoritarian rule were decidedly less than democratic. In both cases, a distinct lack of cohesion that could bind elites together in pursuit of goals other than mere opposition electoral victory was absent. To provide additional support for the argument that elite cohesion is vital in producing democratic outcomes, the following section of the paper examines the divergent case of Serbia in which elite cohesion was present and a democratic outcome was produced.

Divergent Outcomes: Elite Cohesion and Democracy in Serbia-Montenegro

While the fate of electoral revolutions in postcommunist states considered thus far has been bleak, the “Bulldozer” Revolution in Serbia-Montenegro – so-named for the heavy machinery used to charge the studios of Serbian state television, symbolic of the state’s control of the media under Milosevic[47] – produced a more democratic outcome and, for those willing to admit their normative bias in favor of the spread of democracy, a more optimistic one. As will be suggested in the end of this section, the fact that this revolution came first may provide additional explanation for explain why it was relatively more successful. The main purpose of this section, however, is to demonstrate that democratic outcome in Serbia-Montenegro (now Serbia) was greatly shaped by the presence of elite cohesion among the leaders of the opposition movement.

While the Orange Coalition could be described as conveying the perception of unity, as noted above, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) forged true cohesion in uniting their forces against Slobodan Milosevic in the 2000 presidential election and, more importantly, behind DOS presidential candidate Vojislav Kostunica. Agreeing to put differences to the side, elites from 18 parties lent their support to Kostunica,[48] and presented a formidable challenge to Milosevic’s (arguably desperate[49]) attempt to steal the election. In addition to the willingness of elites to compromise the pursuit of personal political interests leading to cohesion amongst members of the DOS, the student-organized non-governmental organization called Otpor (Resistance) was significantly instrumental in generating cohesion among the formerly competing elites. Presciently wary of the weakness of fractious opposition, Otpor members focused their efforts on hours of behind the scenes negotiating with members of the opposition, convincing them that their shared common interests and common goals. Working also in conjunction with media representatives and heads of other NGOs, Otpor achieved a level of collaboration and cooperation among DOS supporters “unseen before in Serbia.”[50]

This development of a forum for compromise and cooperation would prove useful not only in achieving an electoral revolution when Milosevic finally conceded, but also in producing a democratic outcome following the transition from Milosevic’s authoritarian rule. As a result, the regime is able to withstand such potentially divisive shocks as the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003 and the declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008. In both cases, the democratic regime held firmly united without irresolvable intraparty disputes, and moderates continued to win elections over nationalists who vowed harsh crackdowns against ethnic minorities. While the prospect of EU membership certainly played a role in preventing authoritarian backsliding after these instances as Lucan Way notes, the perception of a common goal of EU membership is not a given.[51] Rather, it is the product of a recognition of and coalescence around a common, long-term interest within the current regime. Common goals and common interests produced cohesion within elites agitating for democracy in Serbia-Montenegro, and the legacy of this cohesion can be seen in Serbia today.

An additional factor worth considering in the relative success of democratic transition from authoritarian rule in the Serbia suggested in the introduction to this section is the temporal element of the revolutions. As noted above, the revolution in Serbia-Montenegro occurred in 2000. The subsequent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were carried out in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and were based quite explicitly on the model developed organically in Serbia. Indeed, direct collaboration and information-sharing of those who led the Bulldozer Revolution may seen as crucial in enabling the latter countries to carry out their revolutions. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik’s study of electoral revolutions demonstrates that the latest “wave” of democratization in postcommunist spaces was characterized by a “diffusion” of the electoral model across states.[52] This suggests that geographic proximity, social learning, and temporal factors are important in understanding the conditions under which electoral revolutions may take place. According to the diffusion model, activists who generate successful revolutions in countries such as Serbia-Montenegro work with local activists to teach methods of spreading civic awareness and generating mass mobilization. In Ukraine, for example, techniques and skills learned from the Bulldozer Revolution provided the youth-led civic campaign Pora (“It’s Time”) with resources necessary to engage and mobilize the public. Democracy assistance training seminars held in 2002 and 2003 funded by the British Westminster Foundation, the Dutch Alfred Moser Foundation, and the Polish Fund for European Education brought activists from the Serbian Otpor (Resistance, mentioned above) together with Pora members and Georgian Kmara (Enough) movements to share strategies and build momentum for both Kmara and Pora.[53]

However, while “graduates” of the successful Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia-Montenegro were thus able to impart ideas and strategies for change “package[d]” as the electoral model,” they were unable to – and perhaps uninterested in – transferring a “longer term governance model.”[54] Thus, while Bunce and Wolchik are optimistic about the “diffusion effects” of the electoral model, the outcome they examine is the successful electoral revolution, not the regime that emerges in transitioning from authoritarianism. The main argument of this paper is that electoral revolutions are insufficient to produce successful democratic transitions; a corollary argument suggested here is that not only are electoral revolutions insufficient, but they may actually pre-empt the development of conditions conducive to successful transition. The presence of a model in place to copy – supplemented by democracy assistance funds for implementing such a model as discussed further below – may serve to bring about electoral revolutions before the opposition elite have developed the cohesion necessary for weathering intra-coalition disputes. In this sense, a seemingly successful model for challenging a repressive incumbent regime offered by eager (and funded) teachers may provide incentives for elites to unite temporarily behind a revolutionary movement without providing future incentives to work together. Lacking shared commitment to a longer-term vision than merely ousting the incumbent, elites may split relatively soon after electoral victory, leaving a democracy vacuum that may be filled by yet another authoritarian regime. The further implications of this rather pessimistic take on what were initially causes for optimism in the democracy promotion community, as well as the supplementary role of external funding in facilitating electoral revolutions, are explored below.

Policy implications: The “so what” of fifth wave failures

As has been suggested throughout this paper, electoral revolutions are not sufficient for ensuring democratic transitions from authoritarian rule. A loose coalition of elites united in pursuit of electoral victory may be able successfully to challenge blatant election theft by the incumbent and come to power on a wave of popular indignation, but this is no guarantee of democracy. Even the best-intentioned, most committed democrats may falter in their ability to compromise with each other on issues of policy and power-sharing. This argument builds on the insight that the presence of elections alone does not constitute a democracy, an insight implying that a democracy assistance strategy of promoting regularized elections may be incomplete, while conditionality of foreign aid on elections may be naïve. This paper’s insight that electoral revolutions may bring democratic coalitions to power that are unable or unwilling to govern democratically has similarly cautionary implications. Namely, democracy assistance that is directed towards such currently fashionable targets as promoting civil society development and training political actors in campaigning is insufficient to guarantee democratic outcomes. Further, not only is democracy assistance targeted at producing electoral revolutions insufficient for achieving democratic outcomes, but such funding may arguably inhibit the development of cohesion among opposition elites. By providing the external funding resources necessary to “get out the vote,” democracy assistance may facilitate an opposition win before the opposition has had the opportunity to develop a shared commitment to a coherent platform of policies and strategies for power-sharing that binds them together, i.e. before they develop cohesion. While much scholarly attention is devoted to the obstacles to democracy promotion through external funding,[55] this paper therefore suggests that a challenge to achieving democratic outcomes in addition to those posed to democracy promotion is that posed by democracy promotion, if indirectly.

The level of external financial support for democracy in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine is highly significant, as both states and non-state actors in the international community made the postcommunist region a “major priority” when targeting their democracy assistance funding.[56] In addition to the substantial bilateral-level democracy assistance programs coming from the US and European states as well as those generated at the institutional level by the European Union, George Soros’ Open Society Institute and its local syndicates provided massive amounts of funding to postcommunist states in particular. In the case of Ukraine, for example, the Soros-funded Ukrainian-based International Renaissance Foundation allocated over $6 million in 2002,[57] over $5 million in 2003,[58] and again over $6 million in 2004[59] to democracy assistance projects focusing mainly on civil society development. To remain with Ukraine as an example, the US government spent $34 million on democracy assistance in 2004 alone;[60] the Orange Revolution began in response to the fraudulent November 2004 elections, with the financial basis for mobilizing electoral support firmly in place. While by no means a sufficient condition for achieving electoral revolution (and certainly not a sufficient condition for ensuring that post-revolution regimes transition to democracy) democracy assistance may play a significant role both in generating mass bases of civil society support for mobilization, and in uniting the elites of otherwise disparate groups behind a common goal of challenging a fraudulent election and ousting its victor.

Extending the implications of this argument one step further, democracy promoters should be aware both of the internal instability of the hybrid regimes that may emerge from electoral revolutions, as well as the potential of such regimes for aggressive behavior in the international arena. This implication finds support in existing literature from scholars such as Arthur Goldsmith who suggests that the promotion of democracy may lead to hybrid regimes which are often less stable than either authoritarian regimes or pure democracies.[61] Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder echo this concern, demonstrating that new democracies and less-than-full democracies are more susceptible to capture by nationalist elites and thus may be more conflict-prone.[62] Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that states moving from autocracy to democracy experience an increased willingness to risk war, due to a selectorate expanding faster than the winning coalition (smaller W/S ratio) that allows the leader of a new democracy to behave temporarily as an autocrat unconcerned with the possibility of loss-provoked deposition.[63] This implied potential for increased bellicosity of leaders in the “fifth wave” failures we have considered manifested itself clearly in the Russia-Georgia War in August of 2008. While the debate over “who started it” may never be resolved, Saakashvili’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric in the days preceding the war, as well as his decision to bomb the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali in response to the Russian tanks crossing its border demonstrate the recklessness and aggression of a relatively unconstrained president rather than a leader directly accountable for his actions.[64]

The unsuccessful transitions to democracy from authoritarian rule experienced following the well-funded electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine may thus not only be relevant to scholars of comparative politics but for those who study international relations as well. If it is the case that outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule that are not fully democratic may be less stable internally and more volatile in their foreign policy behavior as in the case of Georgia, scholars as well as funders providing democracy assistance are doubly advised to monitor closely the cohesion of elite opposition, the process of regime transition, and the potential for conflict in this process. Caveat emptor indeed.

Conclusions and suggestions

This paper has argued that a lack of cohesion among elites who are leaders of electoral revolutions is a powerful contributing factor to the failure of democratic regimes to emerge in transitions from authoritarian rule. While we cannot at this point determine that elite cohesion is a necessary condition – and it is certainly not sufficient; cohesion does us no democratic good if the tightly connected elites are committed to authoritarian rule – in the six cases examined here cohesion played a crucial and pivotal role. It is useful therefore to consider the generalizability of our conclusions, and specifically whether the argument travels outside the postcommunist space. There is no clear a priori reason for why lack of elite cohesion produces different results in transitions from neopatrimonial or personalistic regimes than in transitions away from postcommunist authoritarian regimes such as those of Shevardnadze and Kuchma. A very brief discussion of the 1986 electoral revolution in the Philippines is offered as illustrative of this point.

Corazon Aquino’s presentation of a “united front” with former presidential hopeful Salvador Laurel was deemed necessary to challenge the egregiously fraudulent 1986 electoral victory by personalistic autocrat Ferdinand Marcos,[65] but no cohesion between the two elites or within the Philippine Democratic Party-LABAN existed.[66] The electoral revolution was facilitated by mass mobilization of discontent against Marcos as the epitome of the corrupt dictator, as well by mass sympathy with Aquino as the grieving widow and symbolic successor of slain candidate Benigno Aquino. Elite cohesion thus was not necessary for carrying out the revolution, nor did it emerge in its aftermath. Aquino, while refusing to join any party, initially supported the PDP-LABAN (while also supporting the recruitment of former Marcos supporters) and then abandoned the coalition as soon as it was politically advantageous to do so. Such “turncoatism” has endured as a tradition in Philippine politics,[67] with no elite cohesion emerging to bind politicians to one another around a common cause other than electoral victory. As a result, rampant clientelism, familial politicking, vote buying, political violence, and periods under martial law continue to plague the Philippines more than 20 years after the People Power electoral revolution that ousted Marcos.[68] The “guns, goons, and gold”[69] that constitute political life in the Philippines leave the country far from a full democracy in its transition from authoritarian rule under Marcos. Returning to our Freedom House scores, the Philippines received a score of 4 for political rights and a score of 3 for civil liberties in 2009, remaining a Partly Free state.[70]

This brief exploration of the Philippine case provides initial corroborative support for the “no cohesion, no democracy” argument this paper has presented, but further study is required to answer such further questions as whether there conditions under which cohesion of the opposition’s elite matters more or less for regime transition outcomes, what the relative role of mass support as compared to elite cohesion might be, and whether there exists a specific period of time for which elites need to be cohesive in order in establish norms of democratic practice. Further, the cases of Mohandas Gandhi’s work to generate cohesion within the Indian National Congress, as well as Nelson Mandela’s unifying efforts within the African National Congress (deliberately modeled after the INC) might be examined to extend the cohesion argument to transitions from imperial and neo-imperial regimes. Finally, the recent revolutions in the Arab world lead us to ask whether largely “leaderless” revolutions,[71] sparked by widespread digital dissemination of tragic images of the regimes’ victims[72] and fuelled by underlying economic frustrations and resentment of entrenched authoritarian regimes, will lead to stable democratic regimes, or whether the lack of elite cohesion visible even more clearly in these cases than in those discussed in this paper, will lead to stable democratic regimes in each respective country. These are empirical questions, all worthy of future inquiry through the lens of elite cohesion.

In sum, as O’Donnell and Schmitter sagely note, even if regime change does take place, there is no guarantee that democracy will be the outcome of the transition.[73] If we were to adjust our criteria for case selection and extend our analysis to the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, which demonstrated precious little cohesion among elites and serves as the most blatant case of political deal-brokering, even the initial regime brought to power by the revolution contained little sign that any political change had taken place. However, even an opposition coalition that appears in its initial stages of leadership to embrace democracy may founder in internal debates over policy and power-sharing leading to future electoral defeat; in the case of Ukraine this resulted in the election of precisely the handpicked leader whose fraudulent electoral victory the Orange Revolution ousted. Finally, lack of cohesion that leads to elite defection from an initially democratically-inclined coalition such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia may remove internal checks and balances, allowing leaders such as Saakashvili to consolidate executive power even further and act relatively unconstrained. In our attempts to understand and hopefully inform processes of political change, developing an explanation for why supposedly democratic revolutions fail to produce democratic outcomes is a good start. Further inquiry into the conditions under which the critical component of elite cohesion develops is a good next step.

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