The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs

Turkey is changing, and in recent years has been actively using its geostrategic location and foreign policy tools on the Middle Eastern region and beyond. Turkey not only brings together Islam and a democratic identity to the revolutionary Middle East, but also its unique secularism and social cultural identity and structure, thus revolutionary Middle Eastern elites look to Turkey as a model country. Indeed now, Turkey has a chance to make a more powerful influence in the South Caucasus region with a new paradigm, appropriate for the political vacuum in the negotiation process of regional conflicts which are deadlocked and not going forward.

Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan.

As today’s Middle Eastern elites are seeking a model country, this desire is reminiscent of the situation in the South Caucasus in the 1990s. Although, it is wrong to compare different timelines and regions, one indicator important in the 1990s, was Ankara's inability to develop a comprehensive policy towards the South Caucasus region, due to Turkey’s domestic problems and terrible economy. Taking stock of the '90s situation, the “Turkish model,” in the case of South Caucasus and Central Asia was designed by Western countries, in particular the United States, but this past model differs with the current desire of Middle Eastern own dreams. 

Until recent years, Turkey appeared to belong to the pro-Western camp, but there has been a clear policy shift towards the Middle East. Turkey has shown its changing foreign policy shift after the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 by starting initiatives akin to the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” and the rapprochement process with Armenia. An attempted rapprochement with Armenia was part of the Turkish desire for “zero problems” with its neighbors, but the important fact that Armenia receives support from Iran and Russia was not given attention. Ankara tried to realize its ‘strategic depth’ by combining favorable historical strength with geo-strategic pragmatism. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process did not achieve its mission, either in bilateral relations or in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time however growing skepticism is mounting towards Turkey in Armenia. Importantly, the five–day armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 and the unilateral de-jure recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia has changed the security picture of the region, bringing the region to an environment of uncertainty, which has opened new perspectives for Turkey to take a role. 

In fact, the three South Caucasian countries developed diverging strategies to ensure their own security after the August war, due to the ultimately overall regional security paradox, which made the unintended conflictual consequences more tangible. For these reasons, Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the South Caucasus has led to a more complicated situation due different foreign policy strategies toward the region's countries. Turkey’s good and improving relations with Russia and Iran that at first glance have seemed to help Ankara manage this complex relations can serve toward more stable Caucasus. However, the post-August reality has diminished Turkey’s role to counter balancing the rising military tensions in region, rather than not involving in existing status quo. Turkey’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy looked at first to be an effective tool in the South Caucasus, and Turkey sought to use it to win more leverage over the solution of regional conflicts by managing its good relations with regional partners. But, Turkey’s policy implementations quarrel backfired due to the complexity of its relationship with South Caucasus states as well as with its partners, resulting in a policy that first focuses on first needs to implement zero problems within regional countries before it is possible to do more.  In general, achievement of positive Turkish-Russian relations were not helpful in the South Caucasus conflicts because countries that have a common border with Russia have different relations than countries that do not have, save for the  Armenia’s situation, a country which does not have to deal with the Russian threat. So there is no need for pro-Western trends to clash with pro-Russian ones.

Could Turkey change old alignments to a new paradigm? 

The debates over the international political will of the solution of South Caucasus problems remain open, and various international organizations, public figures and think-tanks have pointed to the possibility of starting of new warfare over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan and Armenia are ultimately responsible for a solution; and the international community also has a key role in formulating a settlement and encouraging progress towards it. Despite all the failings of the OSCE Minsk Group, for example, it has managed to develop the Madrid Principles and lead Armenia and Azerbaijan close to accepting them as a blueprint for peace. Additionally, Azerbaijan accepted Madrid principles, but Armenia continuing its non-constructive position. Neither the United States nor the European Union has demonstrated the political will to force the parties into moving forward with the Madrid Principles, the only widely accepted blueprint for a settlement. 

In this regard, Turkey’s role is seems crucial and there are two possibilities to break the deadlock on the Karabakh issue with Turkey’s participation.

A first alternative is Turkey’s representation as a Co-Chair in OSCE’s Minsk Group, which Ankara is indeed a member. In this case, Turkey’s possible representation in Co-Chair functions at OSCE’s Minsk Group is becoming more important after the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process. The Turkish-Armenian thaw, which would have enabled Ankara to exert greater influence on Yerevan vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh, likely would have been successful for several reasons. But, the important question remaining is if Turkey were a Minsk Group Co-Chair during the rapprochement process what would the situation look like? Armenia, as a conflict party of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, was always against Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process and the possibility of Turkey taking on the role of a Co-Chair country. Turkish realpolitik faced Armenian historical alignment in this region, so the “zero problems” policy is not happening.

The other alternative is to host Azerbaijan-Armenian parties in Istanbul or Ankara with the support of Minsk Group Co-Chairs. A new location will lead to new aspirations to resolve of the conflict solution. Turkish policymakers have been improving economic relations with hopes to strengthen political relations as well. If this happens, Russia will likely support Turkey in its candidacy as a Minsk Group Co-Chair. 

In conclusion, with its ‘strategic depth’ doctrine, Turkey is facing strategic overload. It has become difficult for Turkey to achieve “zero problems” due to regional conflicts, and the situation also presents a chance for Turkey to take on a more active role in the diplomatic area. Conflict resolution has to be able to survive international foreign policy objectives, even though this is not always easy. This challenge will put Turkey’s foreign policy to the test in the South Caucasus. As Alexander [the Great] demonstrated with great panache as well, “You can get stuck in Damascus, Baghdad and Teheran wherever your ship is heading.”